book V
the meditations
marcus aurelius
In he morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be
present- I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then
am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which
I exist and for which I was brought into the world? Or have
I been made for this, to lie in the bed-clothes and keep
myself warm?- But this is more pleasant.- Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion?
Dost thou not see the little plants, the little birds, the
ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in
order their several parts of the universe? And art thou
unwilling to do the work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is according to thy nature?- But
it is necessary to take rest also.- It is necessary:
however nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed
bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest
beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So
thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst
love thy nature and her will. But those who love their
several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed
and without food; but thou valuest thy own own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the
dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the
vainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when they
have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither to eat
nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in
thy eyes and less worthy of thy labour?
How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every
impression which is troublesome or unsuitable, and
immediately to be in all tranquility.
Judge every word and deed which are according to
nature to be fit for thee; and be not diverted by the blame
which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a
thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it
unworthy of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading principle
and follow their peculiar movement; which things do not
thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature
and the common nature; and the way of both is one.
I go through the things which happen according to
nature until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath
into that element out of which I daily draw it in, and
falling upon that earth out of which my father collected
the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food
and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it
for so many purposes.
Thou sayest,
Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.- Be it so: but
there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are
altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of
labour, aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion
and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of
superfluity, freedom from trifling magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately able to exhibit,
in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and
unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below
the mark? Or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to
flatter, and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try
to please men, and to make great display, and to be so
restless in thy mind? No, by the gods: but thou mightest have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in
truth thou canst be charged with being rather slow and dull
of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this also,
not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dulness.
One man, when he has done a service to another, is
ready to set it down to his account as a favour conferred.
Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind
he thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he
has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he
has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit.
As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the
game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he
has done a good act, does not call out for others to come
and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on
to produce again the grapes in season.- Must a man then be one of these,
who in a manner act thus without observing it?- Yes.- But
this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man
is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the
social animal to perceive that he is working in a social
manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.- It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not
rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason
thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for
even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if
thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.
A prayer of the Athenians: Rain,
rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the
Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we ought not to pray
at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.
Just as we must understand
when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man
horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of
the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation
or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case
Prescribed means something like this: he prescribed this
for this man as a thing adapted to procure health; and in
the second case it means: That which happens to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this
is what we mean when we say that things are suitable to us,
as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the
pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to
one another in some kind of connexion. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony. And as the universe is made up out of
all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all
existing causes necessity (destiny) is made up to be such
a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity,
destiny) brought this to such a person.- This then was
brought and this was precribed to him. Let us then receive
these things, as well as those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his
prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the
hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of
the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be
judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable,
because it leads to this, to the health of the universe
and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).
For he would not have brought on any man what he has
brought, if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not
suitable to that which is directed by it. For two reasons
then it is right to be content with that which happens to
thee; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed
for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the
other, because even that which comes severally to every
man is to the power which administers the universe a cause
of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest
off anything whatever from the conjunction and the
continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou
dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.
Be not disgusted, nor
discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not succeed in
doing everything according to right principles; but when thou bast failed, return back again, and be content if the
greater part of what thou doest is consistent with man's
nature, and love this to which thou returnest; and do not
return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like
those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For
thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt
repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only
the things which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst
have something else which is not according to nature.- It may be objected, Why what is more agreeable than this which I
am doing?- But is not this the very reason why pleasure
deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom,
simplicity, equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For
what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy course of all things which depend on
the faculty of understanding and knowledge?
Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they
have seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common
philosophers, altogether unintelligible; nay even to the
Stoics themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man who never
changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects
themselves, and consider how short-lived they are and
worthless, and that they may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then turn to the morals of
those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to
endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of
a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such
darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of things moved, what there is
worth being highly prized or even an object of serious
pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a
man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the
natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay,
but to rest in these principles only: the one, that
nothing will happen to me which is not conformable to the
nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in my
power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no man who will compel me to this.
About what am I now employing my own soul? On every
occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire,
what have I now in this part of me which they call the
ruling principle? And whose soul have I now? That of a
child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?
What kind of things those are which appear good to
the many, we may learn even from this. For if any man
should conceive certain things as being really good, such
as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not
after having first conceived these endure to listen to anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But
if a man has first conceived as good the things which
appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily
receive as very applicable that which was said by the
comic writer. Thus even the many perceive the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be
rejected in the first case, while we receive it when it is
said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and
fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we
should value and think those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the comic
writer might be aptly applied- that he who has them,
through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.
I am composed of the formal and the material; and
neither of them will perish into non-existence, as neither
of them came into existence out of non-existence. Every
part of me then will be reduced by change into some part
of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence of
such a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so
on for ever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us
from saying so, even if the universe is administered according to definite periods of revolution.
Reason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are powers
which are sufficient for themselves and for their own
works. They move then from a first principle which is
their own, and they make their way to the end which is
proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they
proceed by the right road.
None of
these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does
man's nature promise them, nor are they the means of man's
nature attaining its end. Neither then does the end of man
lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the
accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things
did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to
despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a
man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want
these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more
of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other
things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of
them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the
same degree he is a better man.
Such as are thy
habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy
mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous
series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where
a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must
live in a palace;- well then, he can also live well in a
palace. And again, consider that for whatever purpose each
thing has been constituted, for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its end is in that
towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there
also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the
good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are
made for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the superior? But the things
which have life are superior to those which have not life,
and of those which have life the superior are those which
have reason.
To seek what is impossible is
madness: and it is impossible that the bad should not do
something of this kind.
Nothing happens to any man
which he is not formed by nature to bear. The same things
happen to another, and either because he does not see that
they have happened or because he would show a great spirit he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that
ignorance and conceit should be stronger than wisdom.
Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the
least degree; nor have they admission to the soul, nor can
they turn or move the soul: but the soul turns and moves
itself alone, and whatever judgements it may think proper
to make, such it makes for itself the things which present themselves to it.
In one respect man
is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do good to
men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the
things which are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind
or a wild beast. Now it is true that these may impede my
action, but they are no impediments to my affects and
disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance
to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a
hindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and that which
is an obstacle on the road helps us on this road.
Reverence that which is best in the universe; and
this is that which makes use of all things and directs all
things. And in like manner also reverence that which is
best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. For
in thyself also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and thy life is directed by this.
That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to
the citizen. In the case of every appearance of harm apply
this rule: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am
I harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be
angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his error is.
Often think of the rapidity
with which things pass by and disappear, both the things
which are and the things which are produced. For substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of
things are in constant change, and the causes work in
infinite varieties; and there is hardly anything which
stands still. And consider this which is near to thee,
this boundless abyss of the past and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who is puffed up with
such things or plagued about them and makes himself
miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short
time.
Think of the universal substance, of which
thou hast a very small portion; and of universal time, of
which a short and indivisible interval has been assigned
to thee; and of that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art.
Does
another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature wills
me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.
Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be
undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of
pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite with them, but
let it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to
their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which
is all one, then thou must not strive to resist the
sensation, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part
of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is
either good or bad.
Live with the gods. And he
does live with the gods who constantly shows to them, his
own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him,
and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of
himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason.
Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? Art
thou angry with him whose mouth smells foul? What good
will this danger do thee? He has such a mouth, he has such
arm-pits: it is necessary that such an emanation must come
from such things- but the man has reason, it will be said, and he is able, if he takes pain, to discover wherein he offends-
I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou
hast reason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational
faculty; show him his error, admonish him. For if he
listens, thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. Neither tragic actor nor whore...
As thou
intendest to live when thou art gone out,...so it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then
get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no
harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost thou
think that this is any trouble? But so long as nothing of
the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what
is according to the nature of the rational and social
animal.
The intelligence of the universe is
social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for
the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior
to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has
brought together into concord with one another the things
which are the best.
How hast thou
behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to
thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou
hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may
be said of thee:
Never has wronged a man in deed
or word. And call to recollection both how many things
thou hast passed through, and how many things thou hast
been able to endure: and that the history of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended: and how many beautiful things thou
hast seen: and how many pleasures and pains thou hast
despised; and how many things called honourable thou hast
spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown
a kind disposition.
Why do unskilled and ignorant
souls disturb him who has skill and knowledge? What soul
then has skill and knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance
and through all time by fixed periods (revolutions)
administers the universe.
Soon,
very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a
name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things which
are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling,
and like little dogs biting one another, and little
children quarrelling, laughing, and then straightway
weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth are fled
Up to Olympus from the
wide-spread earth. What then is there which still detains
thee here? If the objects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception are dull and
easily receive false impressions; and the poor soul itself
is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute
amidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then
dost thou not wait in tranquility for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to another state? And until that time comes, what
is sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods
and bless them, and to do good to men, and to practise
tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything which
is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither thine nor in thy power.
Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of
happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think
and act in the right way. These two things are common both
to the soul of God and to the soul of man, and to the soul
of every rational being, not to be hindered by another; and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the
practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its
termination.
If this is neither my own badness,
nor an effect of my own badness, and the common weal is
not injured, why am I troubled about it? And what is the
harm to the common weal?
Do not be carried along
inconsiderately by the appearance of things, but give help
to all according to thy ability and their fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are
indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage. For it is
a bad habit. But as the old man, when he went away, asked
back his foster-child's top, remembering that it was a
top, so do thou in this case also.
When thou art
calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what
these things are?- Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these people- wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things?-
I was once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not
how.- But fortunate means that a man has assigned to
himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.
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